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MARY DI CORPO, Appellant, v. MICHELE D1 CORPO, 
Respondent. 
[1] Executions - Issuance - After Five Years - Diligence.- To 
authorize the issuance of .execution under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ C85, with respect to unpaid installments for support money 
that have accrued more than five yt.ars !fter entry of a di-
"_ vorce decree, a judgment creditor must show that he has 
exercised due diligence during the five-year period in attempt-
ing to locate property owned by the debtor. Even though 
the court is satisfied as to diligence in this respect, it may 
denY' its process if the debtor shows circumstances occurring 
subsequent to the five-year period upon which, in the exercise 
of a sOund discretion, it should conclude that the creditor 
is not now entitled to collect his judgment. 
[2] Id.- Issuance - After Five Years - Discretion of Oonrt.-
Whether a judgment creditor seeking to enforce his judgment 
more than five years after its entry exercised due diligence 
~': in attempting to locate property owned by the debtor, ;'.1 for 
the trial court to dete~ine in its discretion, and its determina-
tion will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
[1] See 5 Oal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. (1944 Rev.) 759. 
[2] See 11 Oal.Jur. 44; 21 Am.Jur. 31. 
KcK. Dig. References: [1,4] Executions, § 21.1; [2, 3] Execu-
tions, § 23(3); [5] Executions, 112; ~6, 7] Executions, 134. 
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[3] Id.-Issuance-After Five Years-Discretion of Court.-It was 
not an abuse of discretion to deny a divorced wife's motion for 
issuance of execution under Cot.e Civ. Proc., § 685, to enforce 
a judgment for support money, where she failed to set fortb 
facts from which the court might conclude that she had 
exercised due Jilige:Jce in locating defendant's property, where 
she admitted that she took no steps to collect the judgment 
after legal advice that she could not collect it unless defendant 
had an income, and where it appeared that defendant owned 
realty in the county more than five years before such relief 
was sought. 
[4] Id. - I::nance - After Tive Years - Diligence. - A divorced 
wife's diligence or want thereof in enforcing an unpaid judg-
ment for support money for the children awarded to her is 
determinative of the question of her right to issUllDce of 
execution under Code Civ. Proc., § 685, more than five years 
after entry of the judgment. 
[6] Id.-Issuance-Within Five Yeara.-Where a judgment is 
payable in installments, a writ of execution will issue und<>r 
Code Civ. Proc., § 681, as a matter of right on installments 
accruing within the five-year period on an ex parte apI,liea tion 
by the judgment creditor merely showing that such installments 
remain unpaid. 
[6] Id.-Quashing-Burden of Proof.-On motion to recall an 
execution issued on a divorce decree ordering payment of 
support money for minor children, where the wife has pro-
duced proof that installments payable under the decree had 
accrued within five years, the burden is on the defendant to 
establish facts justifying an order recalling the writ. 
[7] Id.-Quashing-Evidence.-A judgment debtor did not make 
a sufficient showing justifying the recalling of a writ of 
execution to enforce payment of installmentll of support 
money for minor children that accrued within five years after 
judgment, notwithstanc:ng his affidavit that the children were 
capable of earuing their own support and that, in view of 
an injury to his back, he was unable to work and support 
himself, where the fact that his home had been unencumbered 
for several years showed that since his injury he had had 
other means of supporting himself, and where he was enabled 
to acquire the property by disregarding his obligation to 
support the children. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County denying issuance of a writ of execution under Code 
Civ. Proc., § 685, and recalling an execution previously issued. 
Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. First order affirmed; second 
order reversed. 
/) 
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Krag " Sweet and David T. Sweet for Appellant. 
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W .. H. Sullivan and Kenneth K. Seott lor Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On April 2, 1931, pursuant to an order 
to show cause for temporary support in a divorce action. 
defendant was ordered to pay plaintiif court cOsta and 
attorney's fees and $12.50 per week for her support and the 
support of their two children. On April 27, 1932, plaintift 
, obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce, which awarded 
her custody of the children and ordered defendant to pay 
her $40 per month for their support and maintenance until 
further order of the court. 
" In June, 1947, plainti1f moved for the issuance of execution 
against defendant under section 685 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure to recover the unpaid balance due under the order 
pendente lite and the installments of $40 per month due 
under the interlocutory decree from April 27, 1932, to May 
29, 1942. This motion was denied by order entered July 11, 
1947. Upon motion of defendant, an order was entered 
July 21, 1947, recalling an execution previously issued pur-
suant to section 681 of the Code of Civil Procedure for 
installments that accrued during the five-year period im-
mediately last past. Plainti1f appeals from both orders. 
'In her affidavit supporting her motion for the issuance 
'of execution under section 685, plainti1f alleged that $5,361 
remains unpaid, that she "has been unable prior to this time 
to find any property of the defendant in this State which 
might be applied to the satisfaction of this judgment; that 
: more than five years have elapsed since the entry of said 
. judgment; that there is now in this State property of the 
, defendant subject to execution whieh may be seized to satisfy 
't,hia judgment." I .,.,' 
i • Defendant filed an aftldavit in opposition to the motion 
alleging that he paid $306.50 pursuant to the order pendente 
lite; that subsequently the order to show cause was removed 
, from the calendar; that on July 21, 1931, he and plainti1f 
through their attorneys entered into a stipulation in which 
,he agreed to withdraw his answer filed in the divorce action 
and to allow plainti1f to obtain judgment by default; that on 
.e same day he and plaintHf entered into a property settle-
• jDent, by which he agreed to convey all of his interest in the fmwUtJ property to her and she qreed to siva him • 
) 
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f'redit of $2,200 on account of installm('nts due 'lr t() beeonl' 
.hl!' by virtue of t.ht' order'pl'ndente litll; and tlHtt hC' \'ouvcypd 
all of his interest in the community property pursuant to 
such agreement. 
He then alleged that from July 21, 1931, until May 12, 
1947, she made no demands on him for payment of accrued 
installments, although for a number of years after the execu-
tion of the agreement" defendant operated a bakery wagon in 
the vicinity where plaintiff resided, and sold bakery products 
on the same street on which plaintiff was residing, and on 
numerous occasions, .. defendant went to plaintiff's home 
and asked her to let him see his children, but she would in 
each instance refuse him admittance to her home, and defend-
ant would only get to see his children at such intervals when 
they would be playing with other children on the side-walk 
or in the street"; that although he had been informed many 
years ago that plaintiff had remarried, he had no knowledge 
of the interlocutory decree of divorce ordering him to pay $40 
per month for the support of the children, since no copy or 
notice of such an order was ever served on him. Defendant 
further alleged that on June 11, 1941, he purchased a five-
room house, which was then free of encumbrance and valued 
at approximately $5,000, and is now worth $8,000; and that 
his deed to this property has been duly recorded in Los 
Angeles County, and the property has been assessed in his 
name on the county tax rolls since 1941. 
His affidavit finally states that "failure for more than 
fifteen (15) years last past to issue or attempt to have execu-
tion issued, has greatly prejudiced the rights of this defend-
ant in, that if the plaintiff ... [had] pressed this defendant 
for payment, or even caused citation to show cause ilJ_con~ 
tempt proceedings to be issued against this defendant, this 
defendant would no doubt have made arrangements to pay 
any delinquencies in monthly installments, but now after he 
has worked hard for many years last past to accumulate his 
home, the property heretofore described, and by reason of 
the fact that some months ago he sustained a severe injury 
to his back, and is unable to work, to issue and enforce execu-
tion against his home, would work great hardship upon him, 
and would amount to confiscation of his said home. . . . that 
at the time he entered into the aforesaid property settlement 
on said 21st day of July, 1931, he had only been in the United 
States from Italy a few years, and at said time did not under-
stand or speak English very well, and when he entered into 
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said settlement, and on the same day conveyed all of his title 
and interest in the community property, he believed that said 
conveyance was in settlement of all claims of the plaintiff 
for support and maintenance. " 
In a counteraffidavit plaintiff alleged that defendant dis-
continued the operation of the bakery route before the entry 
of the interlocutory decree of divorce; that he thereafter 
stated to her that he had no money with which to support 
the children; that between defendant's discontinuance of 
the bakery route and sometime in 1946 she was unaware of 
the location of his residence or of any property owned by 
him; that in 1933 she consulted a deputy district attorney of 
Los Angeles County, who advised her that she would not be 
able to collect the unpaid installments from defendant unless 
she could prove that he had an income; and that in reliance 
upon such advice she did nothing further to satisfy the judg-
ment. She also alleged that in 1944 defendant visited the 
home of one :M:illi Costa, to whom he stated that he wanted 
to know where plaintiff and the children were living so that 
he might contribute to their support. Finally, she alleged 
that she did not recall signing a property settlement agree-
ment, but admitted receiving the property that defendant 
alleged was conveyed to her by virtue of such agreement. 
The property settlement agreement introduced into evidence 
reveals that it was not signed by either plaintiff or defendant. 
. [1] Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
"In all cases the judgment may be enforced or carried into 
execution after the lapse of five years from the date of its 
entry, by leave of the co~rt, upon motion, and after due 
notice to the judgment debtor accompanied by an affidavit or 
'affidavits setting forth the reasons for failure to proceed in 
. compliance with the provisions of section 681 of this code. The 
failure to set forth such reasons as shall, in the discretion 
. of the court. be sufficient, shall be ground for the denial of 
the motion." With respect to installments that have accrued 
:'Dlore than five years a judgment creditor must show that he 
has exercised due diligence during the five-year period in 
~attempting to locate property owned by the debtor. (Lohman 
Y; Lohman, 29 Ca1.2d 144, 148-149 [173 P.2d 6571; Butcher 
~;.Brouwer, 21 Cal.2d 354, 358 [132 P.2d 205J j Beccuti v. 
;'f!olombo Baking 00., 21 Ca1.2d 360, 363 [132 P.2d 2071; 
'Hatch v. Oalkins, 21 Cal.2d 364 [132 P.2d 210] ; Atkinson v. 
fA. tkinson, 35 Cal.App.2d 705, 707 [96 P.2d 824].) "And r'··· J-.:::"-
"
. 
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even though the creditor may have satisfied the court that he 
has proceeded with due diligence to enforce his judgment 
under section 681, the court may still deny him its process if 
the debtor shows circumstances occurring subsequent to the 
five-year period upon which, in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, it should conclude that he is not now entitled to 
collect his judgment." (Butcher v. Brouwer, supra, 21 Ca1.2t1 
354, 358.) [2] Whether or not a creditor has exercist'd 
due diligence is for the trial court to determine in its d is-
cretion, and its determination will not be disturbed in the 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (John P. Mills Org. v. 
Shawmut Oorp., 29 Cal.2d 863, 865 [179 P.2d 570] j Beccuti 
v. Oolombo Baking 00., npra, 21 Cal.2d 360, 363 j Atkinson 
v. Atkinson, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d 705, 707; llc016lland v. 
Shaw, 23 Cal.App.2d 107, 109 [72 P.2d 225].) 
[3] The question arises, therefore, whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denyng the motion for the issuance 
of execution as to installments that have accrued more than 
five years from the date of the motion. Although plaintiff 
alleged that "she has been unable ... to find any property 
of the defendant," her affidavits do not show what efforts 
were made to determine where defendant lived after 1932 or 
to locate any property owned by him. She has failed to set 
forth facts from which the trial court might conclude that 
she had exercised due diligence in locating defendant's prop-
erty. She admits that she took no further steps to collect 
the judgment after a deputy district attorney advised her 
that she could not collect it unless defendant had an income. 
Upon the basia of this advice she should have made investiga-
tions to determine whether defendant had any income or 
property. Moreover, as appears from defendant's affidavit, 
he has owned real property in Los Angeles County since 
1941. It has been assessed in his name since that date, and 
an examination of the tax assessor's records would have 
disclosed his ownership thereof. 
[4] Plaintiff contends that the children should not be 
punished because of her lack of diligence. Since, however, she 
has presumably supported the children out of her own funds 
since 1931, she is seeking, not funds for the current support 
of the children, but reimbursement for funds she has already 
expended for their support. (See Saunders v. Simms, 183 
Cal. 167, 171 [190 P. 806].) Her lack of diligence in enforc-
ing the unpaid judgment is determinative. (See Oot"Jr.rane v. 
. . 
") 
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Cochrane, 57 Cal.App.2d 937, 939 [135 P.2d 714] i Shields 
v. Shields, 55 Cal.App.2d 579, 583 [130 P.2d 982] i McNa~b 
v. McNabb, 47 Cal.App.2d 623, 627 [118 P.2d 869} i Radonich 
v. Radonich, 130 Cal.App. 250,255 [20 P.2d 51].) 
[5] The right to obtain execution upon installmenu that 
have accrued within five years of the date of the application 
for the writ is governed by section 681 of the Code of Civil 
, Procedure, and rests upon different principles. This section 
r' provides: "The party in whose favor judgment is given may, 
, at any time within five years after the entry thereof, have a 
writ of execution issued for its enforcement." A writ of exc-
cutioa will issue under the foregoing section as a matter of 
right upon installments accruing within the five-year period 
on an ex parte application by the judgment creditor, merely: 
showing that such installments remain unpaid. (Wolfe v. 
Wolfe, 30 Ca1.2d 1, 4 [180 P.2d 345] ; Lohma. v. Lohman, t IUpra,29 CaUd 144, 150.) 
~ [6] Thus, upon proof by plaintiJf that installment!' hAve 
, accrued within five years, the burden was upon defcnd:mt to 
establish facts justifying an order recalling the writ. [7] We 
have concluded that defendant did not make a su.t1icient shnw-
ing entitling him to recall the writ 'of execution upon inst.'lll-
ments in the amount of $2,400, which have accrued within 
five years. In his affidavit in support of the motion for the 
recall of execution he made allegations substantially simil'lr 
to those contained in his affidavit in opposition to phlintifl'~ 
motion under section 685,. :a;e ah.!o alleged that the children 
.' are boys, aged 17 and 18, and are capable" of earning their own 
support, and that in view of the injury to his,back he is unllble 
, ,t9, work and support himself, and that to permit execution on 
, ,hiS home would compel him to become a public, ch:u-tre of 
" ~e county and stat". 
" ~. The fact that his home, currently valued at $8,000, or $5,600 
, 'mOre than the amount of the accrued installmenbJ for which 
the writ issued, has been unencumbered since 1941 shows 
Clearly that since his injury he bas nad other mean, of sup-
, Porting himself. Defendant contends that to compel him to 
!~ender a part of the property that he has acquired after 
many years of hard work will be highly inequitable. He: WIUJ 
able; to acquire this property, however, by' disrettardine' his 
obligation to support his children 80 that the burden of their: 
support fell upon plaintiJI. '." , 
" : <' .• The order denying the motion for the isSuance of execution 
to lection 685 is affirmed. The order granting 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
I 
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defendant's motion to recall execution issued pursuant to 
section 681 is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
SPENCE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the first order 
but dissent from the reversal of the second. It appears to me 
that the District Court of Appeal correctly determined, under 
the majority view in Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Ca1.2d 144 [173 
P.2d 657J, that the trial court was justified in recalling the 
writ of execution previously issued (Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, 85 
A.C.A. 728, 193 P.2d 963) ; but in any event, I still adhere 
to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in the 
Lohman case. I do not believe that plaintiff was entitled as 
a matter of right to the issuance of execution in 1947, for 
any alleged unpaid installments which may have accrued 
upon the interlocutory decree which was entered in 1932. 
On the contrary, I believe that the question of whether execu-
tion should have issued and the question of whether the writ 
of execution previously issued should have been recalled 
were matters within the discretion of the trial court. In my 
opinion, both orders should be affirmed as the record shows no 
abuse of discretion. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 20562. In Bank. Dec. 15, 1948.] 
Estate of JOHN! C. FERRALL, Deceased. ALEX C. 
HAMILTON, as Guardian, etc., Respondent, v. BANK 
OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS 
ASSOCIATION et aI., as Co trustees, etc., Appellants. 
[1] Trusts-Actions and Proceedings-Appeal.-An order direct-
ing testamentary trustees to pay a beneficiary a designated 
sum per month from the income and corpus of the trust until 
further order of court, is appeaiabie under Prob. Code, § 1240, 
as an order "instructing . . . a trustee!' 
[2] Id.-Actions and Proceedings-Appeal.-Testamentary trus-
tees may appeal fro:n a probate court order directing increased 
[1] See 25 Oal.Jur. 354; 54 Am.Jur. 490. 
licK. Dig. Reference: [1,2] Trusts, ~ 371. 
